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SWIFT V. TYSON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATE

STATUTES
So much has been written for the law reviews about the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson' that it has become a part of the etiquette
of the business to explain oneself before adding to the overgrown
literature of the subject.2 It is now nearly a century since this
nationalistic 3 doctrine was written into our case law. There has
been some vacillation and even more confusion in its exposition
but in the large it has steadily become more deeply entrenched and
more widely applied in the teeth of the persistent and highly crit'16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842).
2 Notice the first paragraph in Rand, Swift v. Tyson versus Gelpcke v.
Dubuque (1895) 8 HARV. L. REv. 328.
3 See Waterman, The Nationalism of Swift v. Tyson (1933) 11 N. C. L.
REV. 125.
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ical'opposition of legal writers.4 . But now," in a day of vnparalleled nationalism, the Siipreme Court has had occasion to impose a
definite check upon the further extension of the doctrine." That
event calls for comment.
SIt is not the purpose of, this note to consider all of the ramificaiions of iS'wift v. Tyson. A brief review of its major Implications will suffice.
I . The reader is, reminded that, in defiing the 'jurisdiction of
the federal' courts in the First Judiciary Act, Congress enacted a
requirement that " The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution, treaties 'or statutes-of the;United States otherwise
require or provide, shall be X'egardedas r lesof decision in trials
at common law in courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.".
The provision plainly applies to actions at law where federal
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. It seems equally
plain that it was intended that in diversity cases, the federal courts
were to apply the law of a dierent sovereign.' There is no general common law in the United States. There is a common legal
background and an important and 'persuasive interchange of legal
ideas, 8 but in the last analysis there are as ,many independent systems of common law in this country as there are states which have
a common law. The Supreme Court early made it plain that there
was no criminal common law of the United States." There is no
more reason to assert that We have a federal common law govern4 Much- of the secondary li-erature of the subject is cited in Dobid, Seven
Implications of Swift v. Tyson (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 225, 226. n.
JGiBurns Mortgage Co.- v. 'Fried,. 292 MJS. 4S7, 54 S. Ct. 813, 92 A. l. R.
1193 (1934).
6 1 STAT. 92, 28 U. S. C. A. (1926) § 725.
See (HAMLTON) THE FEIMMLIST (Dunne, 1901) No. LXXX
'8tihas been suggestedby an able scholar, in reliance in part' at eastupon
studies-,reyealing, how freely-an American ,state court cites and, follows decis.

ions from other states, that there is

"1

....

an unwritten law, of which the

decekbiis of every common'law state are evIdence; . ..
If we exAind care.
fully our conditions, we shall find that-the'law which we really study and
practice is not merely. the local law of, the state, but some more general law
whose precepts will guide us in the solution of a question arising in any' court
of, the country." 'Beale, Juristic Law and Judicial Law (1931) 37 W., VA.
L. .Q. 237, 246- 47. This observation is a realistiq one. It does not support
Swift v. Tyson, however, since the'influenee 'of jurisielaw in mr system
is due largely to'its persuasiveness; 'a state' court is not bound to: rely upon
it, however strong its authority in reason, since the authority of the state is
not behind it. See n. 16, infra.
9 United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheaton 415, 4 L. Ed. 124 (1,816); Pnitod
States v.'Hudson and'Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 3 TL. 'Ed. 259 (1812), Sep
Western Union Telegraph ,Co. v. Call Publishing CO., 181 U. $. 92, '21 S. Ct.
561 (1901) (interstate commerce) Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465" 8 S. Ct,
564 (1888).
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ing civil relations. Swift v. Tyson has simply created such a law
for diversity cases. When the Judiciary Act became law, moreover, there was little statutory substantive law governing civil relations. If the requirement of the act were to be deemed applicable
only to statutory state "laws" in diversity cases it would have
been largely wanting in practical import. But in the absence of
statute a federal court could use its own independent judgment in
determining what was the law of a given case. That, however, was
precisely the effect of Mr. Justice Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson, though he apparently would not have exercised the power in
a case involving settled rules of what he considered local law. He
granted that the federal statute applied to positive statutes of a
state but insisted that state decisions on common law matters were
not "laws" within the Act. Recent researches support the view
that Congress was using "laws" in the broader sense. 10 Whether
the judges make the common law of a state or merely discover it
is a bootless inquiry in the present connection. A becoming frankness on the part of notable contemporary jurists recognizes that
judges do make law.
In Swift v. Tyson, Story was making law
not only in that he was deciding that under the law merchant of
New York a pre-existing debt was value for purposes of constituting one a holder in due course, but also, in effect, by giving the
Judiciary Act a meaning not intended by its authors. But granting for the moment that judges only find the law, once the judges
of a state have found the applicable rule of law, that determination is conclusive within the jurisdiction. In other words, the common law of the state is revealed only in the decisions and opinions
of its courts and what they find to be the law is applied as the law
till changed by decision 2 or statute. Thus, if it be admitted that
the federal courts are applying the "laws" of another sovereign
in actions at law based on diversity of citizenship, they should
deem state court exposition of state law conclusive.
It is common learning that diversity jurisdiction was conferred upon the federal courts by the Constitution to secure equal30 Warren, New Light on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923)
37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 81-88.
" See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Kuhm v. Fairnont
Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 370, 371, 30 S. Ct. 140, 147, 148 (1910); CARDozO,
TnE NATURE OP THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922), 115 et seg. In the Kuhn case,
Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out the inconsistency on this point between Swift
v. Tyson and Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. 175, 17 L. Ed. 520 (1863), citing
GRAY NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw (1909) §§ 535-550. The point had
previously been made by Rand, op cit. supra n. 2, at 341 et seq.
12 Stare Decisis is relatively seldom overriden. Courts, of course, sometimes
overrule a past decision indirectly though verbally distinguishing it.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1935], Art. 4
EDITORIAL NO2T E
That
ity before the courts without regard to state citizenship.
object would plainly be secured and maintained by applying in a
diversity case, as a matter of obligation, the law as administered
in a similar case between citizens of the same state. It was long
since pointed out,' 3 on the other hand, that to apply Swift v. Tyson in diversity cases may work a discrimination, based solely on
the factor of citizenship, which is just as objectionable as discriminating against an alien in behalf of a citizen. Can it fairly be
said, then, that the doctrine promotes the object of diversity jurisdiction?
It has been the practice, with a few notable exceptions, 14 to
apply Swift v. Tyson only in cases involving "general jurisprudence" or "commercial law"." There is, of course, no constitutional or statutory basis for the distinction, 6 and, if the doctrine is sound, it must be deemed t,- uover all common law matters.
That is the logic of the federal decisions. 1
On consideration of
policy alone, state common law decisions on matters which the
federal courts regard as of local import are followed in diversity
cases. (One might call to mind, parenthetically, familiar judicial
protestations that the policy-maling power is legislative and not
judicial.) The real impact of the doctrine as an assertion of federal judicial power is to emasculate Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act; the obligation to apply state law has given way to a power
to mold state common law as the federal courts think it ought to
be without regard to expositions of that law, which are final and
unimpeachable for state purposes.
As Professor Dobie has indicated,' it is quite an anomalous situation which presents the federal courts exerting the power to nationalize the common law for
purposes of diversity cases, when the power has clearly not been
granted to the federal Congress itself.
"3Rand, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 337.
14As to the extension of the doctrine into real property law, see Note (1934)
40 W. VA. L. Q. 258.
15 These expressions have no definite legal content and thus it is not surprising that there is an uncommonly large twilight zone in their application.
The cases are too numerous to require citation. A fairly recent sample is
Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab
and Transfer Co., infra n. 16.
L
Ie See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Black and White
Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.,
276 U. S. 518, 532-533, 48 S. Ct. 404, 408-409 (1928).
17 This does not always appear in the opinions, of course, but it is quite
apparent in substance from such decisions as Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
supra n. 11.
is Op cit. supra n. 4, at 234.
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Mr. Justice Story granted in Swift v. Tyson that Section 34
of the Judiciary Act applied to the positive statutes of a state and
the construction thereof adopted by the courts of the state. 9 If
the judicial exposition of a statute be deemed a part of it this conclusion is obvious. 20 Its soundness, however, does not depend upon
the literal application of that theory.21 State statutes are in reality
what they are interpreted to be in administration by authoritative
state agencies, in the last analysis, by the state court of last
22
resort.
In practice, however, Story's conclusion has not been strictly
adhered to. Gelpcke v. Dubuque,23 strangely enough as a matter
of legal theory, accepted the notion that judicial construction is
part of a statute as a basis for holding that with respect to rights
arising after and depending upon a former state construction of
a state statute the federal courts will not follow a change in the
state construction. The court has recently repudiated the idea
that Geipcke v. Dubuque was based on the contract clause of the
federal Constitution.24 If that be true, there is no basis for such
a decision since nothing is plainer in our system of law than the
2
proposition that judicial decisions may operate retrospectively. 1
Later decisions, however, establish the even more tenuous notion
that a federal court will make its own independent construction of
a state statute, where the first state construction was made after
tie federal case arose. 28 Logically, if the state exposition of a
19

16 Pet. 1, 18, 10 L. Ed. 865, 871 (1842),

20 The Supreme Court early embraced this theory in Green v. Lessee of

Neal, 6 Peters 291, 8 L. Ed. 402 (1832).
21 The theory is not acceptable. The court's interpretation of the statute
is conclusive on everyone else, but it, in common with any other decision, is
subject to be overruled or modified by the court itself and thus is not literally
a part of the enactment.
22 The .writer has previously stated his views on this point in The Federal
Courts and the Construction of Uniform State Laws (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv.
423.
23
upra n. 11.
24 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 44 S. Ct. 197 (1924). Mr.
Justice Taft's opinion in the case has been ridiculed as a plain contradiction
of the express language of the Gelpcke case. 2 BouDiN, GovEmxENT BY
JUDICIARy (1932) 329, 343n. The criticism is well taken. Mr. Boudin asserts
further that the Gelpcke case has been repudiated by the Court. It is true
that the Court might take a different view today on the merits of the legal
question presented in that case but there has been no repudiation of the theory
under discussion.
25 The proposition is too clear to require citation. Notice the language of
Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Kuhn v. Fairnont Coal Co., supra
n. 11, at 215 U. S. 372.
20 Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 S. Ct. 10 (1882). The same idea has
been applied as to a real property question under the common law of a state.
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., supra n. 11.
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statute is. conclusive, it is authoritative for any case not yet decided, though'alea dy pending. 1'eople do not have vested rights
in what thiey 'thinI statutes mean. That t~e interests of 'the parties
accrued before the state decision obviously does not preclude a
contrctidn on the m'eris by a' state cout, which deternines what
the law of the state is." These iews, find ample 'support ' a
freshly-decided Supreme Court case, which, in effect, repudiates
the' Ahsstated feaeral 'court aberration. In Atarine National
Exchdnge Bank- of Milwadkee, Wisconsin v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfq.
jo.,27a the Court decided that a Wisconsin construction of the
Negotialie 'Instrumens L aw 'was controlling:in a diversity case
tf tsinvolving trailsactions conduicted after te encte

tute ut eoe tn

was renered.

The Wisconsin decision
o ;Mr.
eardozo
Justice" ¢wrt
for the Court " d.e
'"gre irrespective of the daie' wh nede.
supplies tiegOver"n,
'
eision was announced."
Apart from these two anomaies the upreme Court'.ias adhered rather consistently to the idea that state court constiuction
of state&laws is authoritafive in diversity cases. With the advent
-orm
tae aws,however, some ingenious mind suggested a
of 'um

furth~er exceitioh, v]ich seveal ofthe lower federal courts have

taken seriously.2 In short, it is urged that insofar as state legislation is merely codfication of the common law or law, merchant,
wift ). Tyson ap.plies. The reportea cases have volved' relatively liie actual Iexertion of the asserted power but the possibility of its approval by the Supreme, Court gave the, matter ,a serious
cast. -In 1929 the ,writer,,published, a brief', discussion of the -sub:baa'S
. had
h'
ject in which he expressed, the 'o ' w vht
either -in law:or policy. 29 'In this position he has not stood alone.2
And~fov thWe Supreiae Court hs spoln plaiily .to .he pqiit,,
'--i The Oburt follow ed'a ske coistructlon made ttfter the federal 6age arose
without mention of the notion in People of Sioux County, Neb. v. National
Surety C,, 276 _U. S. 238, 48 S. Ct. 239 (1928). The Court doubtless aporoved
the'-statce construction- on the Inerits. The' itate eoustrdetion' waa followed iA
8. 123,
Fidelit, NationAl 'Bank and Trust Co. of Kansas' ity t. Si6pe, 274'.
47- S. Ct. 51(1927). " The Court 'pdintod to fle fncb that' the state decision
effected 'n6"change' in'"the local law'upon- which the parties rehibd.' But t1dt,
i6-'frue"in any cash ii- which the- fivst a'ithbritative estate' constiuctioa, is niade
,fei ethe' queston comes up ina 'feleial court.'
.
: '
'2,
55v S. Ct: 226 '-(Ded. 10, 1934).'
'Th'd' cases'
28 The lower federal courts have been divided on the point.
deei&de 'bWfore 1929 are digoussed in Foraham,"op. oft. 8itprd'.D. 22. S6e the
collection of cases 'intfle principal case, szpra i. '5Z at 54 S."Ct, 813, 815, nn.
11 and 12.
'
"
29 Op.-cit. mupr n. 22.'
29 See Dobiej op;'cit. snpra n., 4, at 236-238.'

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss2/4

6

Fordham: Swift v. Tyson and the Construction of State Statutes
137
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried31 was a diversity case in a federal
court in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff sued on six promissory notes
executed and payable in Florida, which were acquired from the
payee before maturity and which were payable in series at intervals of six months, "with interest thereon (the principal) at the
rate of 7 per cent per annum from date until fully paid. Interest
payable semi-annually . . . . Deferred interest payments to bear
interest from maturity at ten per cent per annum . . . ." The district court decided that the notes were not negotiable for want of
certainty in amount and gave judgment for defendant since under
the local practice an assignee could sue in his own name only on
negotiable paper. The Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming refused to consider as controlling a Florida case relied upon by
piaintiff, but, relying on Swift v. Tyson, determined the question
of negotiability in accordance with what "we find to be the general commercial law". The court recognized that state construction of statutes modifying the common law or the law merchant
would be binding in a diversity case. Judgment was reversed in
the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the whole
Court, reaffirmed the view that under Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act state construction of state legislation was as binding in diversity cases as if "the state court's decision were literally incorporated into the enactment" and added that this was true without regard to whether the statute altered the common law or
whether it related to matters of general interest.
It is true that the Court could have decided the case without
reference to Swift v. Tyson since there was no Florida case in
point. The Court recognized that in the case32 relied on by plaintiff it was decided merely that a provision for periodical payment
of interest before maturity of principal did not destroy negotiability but reasoned that the logic of the decision would apply to a
stipulation for interest at a specified rate upon overdue interest.
This, taken with the fact that the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals was attributable, at least in part, to the view that Swift
v. Tyson applied, rendered it appropriate for the Court to pass
on the question. In an even more recent case, which involves a
clear cut application of the Burns dictum, and thus constitutes a
decision on the point, the Court was content to declare that by the
"judgment" in the Burns case "the law is settled"." -a
3

3

l Supra n. 5.

2Taylor v. American National Bank of Pensacola, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678

(1912).

3.2a Marine National Exchange Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., supra n. 27a.
The quoted language is significant. Mr. Justice Cardozo is frankly saying
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In one respect the Burns opinion goes even further than to declare that a state decision in point would control in a diversity case.
In the absence of such, a decision it would be the duty of the federal court, it was asserted, to construe the statute in the light of
the decisions of courts of other states interpreting the same sections of the uniform law, and the court proceeded to do just that.
Decisions from other states would thus be persuasive in a diversity case just as in a state court case. This, it is believed, will do
more to promote uniformity than Swift v. Tyson. It is difficult
to perceive, moreover, how complete uniformity could be attainable without important changes in the distribution of powers under
the federal system.38
for the Court that it has previously made a ruling with the authority of law
for future cases.
33 Since the body of this note was completed there has come to the writer's
attention an adverse criticism of the views of the court in the principal
case. See Beutel, Common Law Judicial Technique and the Law of Nego.
tiable Instruments - Two Unfortunate Decisions (1934) 9 TuL. L. REv..64.
(The title to this article is misleading. Professor Beutel approves the decision in Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried but is dissatisfied with the "9dictum"
about Swift v. Tyson.) In brief, it is Professor Beutel's theory that judicial decisions are not law but "rise no higher than evidence of the common
law", and that when the law is embodied in a statute court decisions are
not even the best evidence of the law but "can rise no higher than mere
interpretation of the law". He contends that this must necessarily be so as
to the Negotiable Instruments Law since it "is a codification of the whole
body of the law of negotiable instruments for the entire United States.-"
Since, he argues, state courts do not feel bound by their own decisions, where
they are out of harmony with the weight of authority or the true interpretation of the Act, why should the federal courts be bound to follow such decisions blindly.
The first and most real objection to Professor Beutel's position is that he
has not shown that the application of his views will bring us any nearer that
important objective - uniformity in construction of uniform laws. Within
a single state federal recognition of state construction is the only way to attain uniformity. A change in state construction would call for a like change
of interpretation in the federal courts; the latter would follow a trail blazed
by state tribunals. On the other hand, federal court independence of state
construction, where asserted, leads inevitably to conflict. It is hardly to be
supposed that state judges are going to be brought in line by the pressure of
federal decisions which they are likely to consider a challenge to their independence. Whether Swift v. Tyson would conduce to national uniformity cannot be answered categorically. This much can be said, the possibilities of
divergence would obviously be greatly increased by the very fact that the
number of courts speaking independently would be much greater. Thus, in
each federal circuit the various district courts would act independently until
the circuit court of appeals had passed upon a given problem of interpretation and the same would be true as regards the several circuit courts of appeals until the Supreme Court had spoken. Despite judicial participation in
the desire for uniformity, why is there not substantially the same likelihood
that the lower federal courts will be divided at points of cleavage as that
the state courts will be? There is no assurance, moreover, that a given question will reach the Supreme Court soon after it is first aired in a lower federal
court. Consider the long career (over twenty-five years) of the point, which
is the subject of this note, before the Supreme Court had its say, and then

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss2/4

8

Fordham: Swift v. Tyson and the Construction of State Statutes
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Little is to be gained by speculating about the principal case
as a suggestion of future judicial inroads upon the doctrine. But
one can say not only that the Court has taken a sound position
but also that its position relative to the construction of state statutes is basically inconsistent with Swift V. Tyson as applied to the
common law. It is true that legislation and common law differ in
important respects, but they are not material to the true construction of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act. Both in construing state
statutes and in declaring the common law a state supreme court
is expounding with finality for state'administration the law of the
state. If in a diversity case the federial court disregards either type
of decision the effect is the same, - the law of the state is not being given the content it has as administered by the state. Thus,
the overruling of Swift v. Tyson is quite in order.34 Meanwhile
the extent of a state's freedom from the doctrine will depend upon
35
how far legislation has supplanted its common law.
-J=w B. FORDfALi.
only by dictum. Conceivably a negotiable instruments question might have
a similar experience in the federal courts. On top of this, what assurance is
there that the federal interpretation when established will conform to the
majority state court interpretationi It should not escape notice that in the
very case under scrutiny the circuit court of appeals applied Swift v. Tyson
only to reach a result contrary both to the majority of the state decisions
and to what Professor Beutel considers a sound conclusion. Beutel, op. ct.
supra at 66.
The text of this note is the writer's answer to Professor Beutel's theoretical arguments. It may be added that, though stare decisis is loosing its hold
upon the courts in negotiable instruments law cases, as Professor Beutel, in
effect, asserts, the soundness of excluding Swift v. Tyson in such cases is
unaffected. The Negotiable Instruments Law is a separate law in every state;
under our system it could not be otherwise. And to permit federal judicial
administration of that law different from state administration is to put different content into the law for diversity cases. I cannot believe that so
liberal a thinker as Professor Beutel would deny that where interpretation
is required the courts are really settling the content of the law. If that be
true a change in interpretation has the same effect upon the citizen as an
amendment to the statute. Thus, the principal effect of stare deeisis upon
the law in action is doubtless to make for less flexibility either in behalf of.
greater fairness to particular litigants or for other reasons.
Professor Beutel's insistence that we should get away from "outmoded"
common law jiidicial technique in interpreting uniform laws is quite commendable insofar as it tends to confine the process of interpretation to an.
attempt to arrive at the truo meaning of legislation without weighing extrinsic factors. But it should be kept in mind that the desire for uniformity
may, in a given case, as might stare decisis, be just such an extrinsic factor.
Would he insist that a state court give up its convictions on the merits simply
to get in line with the majority of state courts that had spoken to the point?
34 This, of course, would not impair the jurisdiction of the federal courts
to disregard a state decision which discriminated against aliens.
s Were the West Virginia Legislature, for example, to adopt the Restatement of Contracts of the American Law Institute as the law of trie state
would the decision in the principal case apply? Since the process would be
codification and the product legislation an affirmative answer seems proper.
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